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Abstract
Although the Talang Sari tragedy as a part of the representation of Indonesian
Muslim oppression during the authoritarian regime, it is relatively lesser known
for Indonesian public. The avoidance of the most Indonesian Muslim who
did not support it is one of those facts. Indeed, they did a less attention to
talk and to articulate the case to the public. This paper intends to revisit the
case of the Talang Sari as one of the unsolved human rights violation during
the authoritarian regime. It is not only exploring the case and also examining
the context of violence, but also tracing dynamic of the case during and post
of authoritarian regime by the emergence of Islah agreement as cultural impu-
nity to forget the past for many victims. The questions deals with in this paper
are following: what kind of conditions that made the Talang Sari was happen-
ing in East Lampung in 1989, South Sumatra during the Suharto presidency?
How did the Suharto regime control the discourse of the tragedy in Indone-
sian public that eventually encourage most Indonesian Muslim did not ac-
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tively respond the killings? Although the reformasi era gives an opportunity
break silences by asking justice to the current Indonesian government on hu-
man rights violation, why those cases, especially the Talang Sari, are unsolved?
This paper divided into three parts to answering the questions. Firstly, it is to
understand the case of Talang Sari by discussing the context of the New Order’s
policy on Indonesian Muslim and its political ideology. Secondly, it is to read
deeply mass media in making discourse on the case as one of the triggers for
most Indonesian Muslim did not respond it. Thirdly, it is to analyze the Islah
agreement (reconciliation in Islamic term) as the primary factor that contrib-
uted why cultural impunity has seemingly embedded to bring justice to the
victims of violence generally in the post of Suharto regime.
Meskipun Peristiwa Talang Sari sebagai bagian dari representasi penindasan
masyarakat Muslim Indonesia selama rejim otoriter berkuasa, peristiwa itu
jarang diketahui oleh publik Indonesia. Pengabaian kebanyakan Muslim Indo-
nesia yang tidak mendukung upaya penyelesaian kasus tersebut adalah salah
satu buktinya. Bahkan, mereka tidak membicarakan dan mengangkat kasus
Talang Sari di ruang publik. Artikel ini bermaksud melihat kembali peristiwa
Talang Sari sebagai salah satu kasus pelanggaran yang belum diselesaikan. Selain
mengeksplorasi kasus, menjelaskan konteks kekerasan, artikel ini juga
menelusuri dinamika kasus tersebut sebelum dan pasca rejim Orde Baru,
khususnya seiring dengan kemunculan Islah sebagai Impunitas Kultural untuk
melupakan masa lalu oleh sebagaian korban. Pertanyaannya yang diajukan dalam
artikel ini adalah: kondisi-kondisi semacam apa yang membuat kasus Talang
Sari terjadi di Lampung Timur pada tahun 1989, Sumatera Selatan saat presiden
Suharto berkuasa? Bagaimana rejim Suharto mengontrol wacana peristiwa
tersebut yang membuat kebanyakan masyarakat Islam Indonesia tidak
menanggapi peristiwa tersebut? Meskipun pasca rejim Orde Baru memberikan
kesempatan untuk menyelesaikan kasus tersebut dengan mendesak untuk
mengajukan keadilan kepada pemerintah Indonesia, mengapa peristiwa Talang
Sari tidak atau belum diselesaikan hingga sekarang?. Untuk menjawab
pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut, saya membagi penjelasan ini kepada tiga bagian.
Pertama, memahami kasus Talang Sari dengan mendiskusikan konteks kebijakan
rejim Orde Baru dalam menghadapi umat Islam dan ideologi politiknya. Kedua,
membaca lebih dalam media cetak dalam membuat wacana peristiwa tersebut
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melalui liputan yang dibuat. Asumsi ini diajukan karena liputan media tersebut
menjadi salah satu penyebab mengapa kebanyakan umat Islam tidak merespon
peristiwa tersebut. Ketiga, menganalisis persetujuan Islah, rekonsiliasi dalam
perspektif Islam sebagai faktor utama yang memberikan kontribusi terhadap
impunitas kultural untuk membawa keadilan ke jalan yang lebih sulit kepada
korban secara umum pasca rejim Suharto.
Keywords: Talang Sari; Victims; Lampung; Islah; Islam; Human rights abuses
Introduction
His name is Azwar Kaili. He was born in 1942 in Painan, Padang, and
South Sumatra. Due to local politic tension in his hometown, at the 18
years old he migrated to follow his uncle, Sahadi, in Tanjung Karang, in
the residence of South Lampung in 1959. He met with his wife, and then
they married on March 13, 1973. Working as both farmer and local trader
with many businesses especially anything that related to agriculture, they
steeply became a wealthy people in Sidorejo, East Lampung. However, a
call letter on 6 February 1989 at 08.00 a.m. which had been sent to him
for coming in the district of Jabung, had changed their life dramatically.
He and his wife, as well as the two of their children, were arrested sepa-
rately in the different prison. They thought as one of the members of
Talang Sari for the two reasons. Firstly, it was due to his the biggest boy
who was taking his high school in Islamic boarding school in Talang Sari
under Warsidi’s teaching. Secondly, it is because of his kindness to Zamzuri
as a close neighbor where he often gave a room to sleep for Zamzuri’s
guests whose coming from Jakarta. Meanwhile, Zamzuri himself was the
wealthy farmer who was interested in Warsidi’s Islamic teaching. After
releasing from the prison, their house was burned, and the valuable things
they had were seized. Indeed, while he tried to advocate himself to the
office of local police by sending a protest letter, he then prisoned for one
month. This sadness did not stop here. For many years, he and his family
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must live under stigma as Mujahidin people (orang-orang Mujahidin),
the insurgent group who fight against the Indonesian government. This
condition could not make them freely as an Indonesian citizen to do
anything, especially establishing social interaction with their neighbors
and supporting their economy by being a trader as before it.1
The story above describes an impact of the tragedy for Indonesian
Muslim that has changed their life during the Suharto regime presidency.
Although the event of Talang Sari in Lampung (1989), South Sumatra,
as one of the two events representing Indonesian Muslim’s oppression
during the New Order, it is relatively lesser known for Indonesian public.
It could be seen by the avoidance of the most Indonesian Muslim who
did not support the Talang Sari actively. Indeed, they did a less attention
to talk and to articulate the case in the public as well as only two human
rights NGOs concerns to support it, mainly both KontraS and Komite
Smalam. It is difference response in comparison with the case of Tanjung
Priok. In my earlier writing, I noted that “there are two organizations
that defend the case of Tanjung Priok, namely SONTAK (National Soli-
darity for the victims of Tanjung Priok tragedy) led by Syarifini Maloko as
part of the victims and a student organization of KOMPAK (Student and
Youth Committee for non-Violence led by Yayan Hendrayana”. In addi-
tion, before the two organizations built, as I asserted “there were two thou-
sands of Indonesian Muslim attending Islamic gathering on September 12,
1998 in order to remember the tragedy of Tanjung Priok, including Is-
lamic prominent from various backgrounds such as Yuzril Ihza mahendra
(the Crescent Star Party), Said Aqil Siradj (Nahdatul Ulama), Jalaluddin
Rahmat (Islamic scholar), and Munir Thalib (KontraS’s activitist)”.2 Though
1 Wahyudi Akmaliah, Dari Penjara Ke Penjara: Narasi Personal Kehidupan Azwar Kaili,
Korban Peristiwa Talang Sari, 1989, unpublished article, 2010, 1-5.
2 Wahyudi Akmaliah, Menggadaikan Islah : Politisasi Islah  di Kalangan Korban Priok
(1984), 2009, 82.
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the Talang Sari is not a part of a social memory of most Indonesian
nationally, it is one of the cases investigated by the National Commission
on Human Right (Komnas HAM) where the result has been brought as a
recommendation to the Attorney General (Kejaksaan Agung).
I intend to revisit the case of the Talang Sari as one of unsolved hu-
man rights violation during the authoritarian regime. It is not only ex-
ploring the case and also examining the context of violence, but also
tracing dynamic of the case during and post of an authoritarian regime
by the emergence of Islah agreement as cultural impunity to forget the
past for many victims. The questions deal with in this article is following:
what kind of conditions that made the Talang Sari was happening in
East Lampung in 1989, South Sumatra during the Suharto presidency?
How did the Suharto regime control the discourse of the tragedy in Indo-
nesian public that eventually encourage most Indonesian Muslim did not
actively respond the killings on it? Although, the reformasi era gives an
opportunity break silences by asking justice to the current Indonesian
government on human rights violation, why those cases, especially the
Talang Sari, are unsolved?
Islam and the Talang Sari tragedy in New Order context
How did the Suharto Presidency dealt with Islam?
Although Islam is majority religion in Indonesia that have been prac-
ticed by around of 80 % from all of the Indonesian population, a rela-
tionship between government and Islamic society (including community,
party, as well as ideology) always went up and down. Compared with the
Sukarno presidency, this dynamic relation could be seen clearly during
the Suharto administration for 32 years in his power. It indirectly has
changed the path of Islam in post of the authoritarian regime to define
an identity of Indonesian Muslims and to imagine what the face of Islam
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within the Indonesian nation is and, on the other hand, as part of the
global context of ummah. Instead of thinking the New Order as an anti-
Islam during his power, they had different policies that often related to
the context of authority they made as well as allies they built. Given this
explanation, there are three periods of relation how the Suharto presi-
dency deal with Islam in issuing a different policy.
In the first period, it is to place most Indonesian Muslims as a partner
to kill those people who involved and related with the Indonesian Com-
munist Party (PKI) and it is under bows as well as labeling people as PKI
during 1965-1966 (1965-1970s). At least, there are two of mass Muslims
organization that are suspected had involved in this killing, namely
Nahdatul Ulama (NU) with its organization apparatus, Banser (Barisan
Ansor Serba Guna) and the rest of Masyumi’s people that spread into
the small Muslim groups. Both a ‘conflict ideology’ that had ever emerged
a ‘religious tension’ and labeling the PKI as the biggest evil through a
fiction story are the two triggers as a seemingly reasonable choice to en-
courage them as a killer. As well known, during the Sukarno presidency,
the PKI was one of the biggest parties, supported by Sukarno to do land
reform. Both the PKI and the mass Muslims organizations, represented by
the party of NU and Masyumi, historically had the different ideology that
caused conflict. Therefore, these historical backgrounds and the fiction
stories of the PKI were as the firm legitimacy for the two organizations to
kill them. Although, in the level of grassroots, there were some plans sys-
tematically that had been provided the piece of the list of the name as a
target for killing. Here, both Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersenjata as the
military’s non-communist national newspaper were another useful mate-
rial as the primary factor to exaggerate and escalate for the killings.3
3 Saskia Wieringa, Penghancuran Gerakan Perempuan di Indonesia. Jakarta: Garba Budaya,
1999.
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In the second period, it is to make Indonesian Muslims as a threat of
the New Order’s enemy after PKI (1970-1990s). Despite Muslims from
various religious groups as butchers to kill the PKI and its sympathizers, it
does not mean they also became ‘a close friend.’ For the New Order
regime, Islam was the threat as same as the PKI that could challenge
their policies. They became anti-Islam after strengthening their both in-
frastructure and structure in the level of government through the mili-
tary backing as well as creating a political system to be centralized by
curtailing political freedom only the three parties in Indonesian political
system (PPP, PDI-P, and Golkar). Also, they also controlled all political
parties and all mass organizations by forcing them to adopt the state of
ideology as the sole of their ideological basis. Some of those indications
were they did not allow the rise of political Islam and Islamist parties by
not giving a permit to re-establish and revived Masyumi party which had
been banned by the Sukarno presidency in 1959. They also prohibited
Muslim girl from wearing the veil in the public schools and did not allow
prostitution districts (lokalisasi) and gambling. Also, they attempted to
recognize aliran kepercayaan (indigenous mysticism) as a legal religion in
Indonesia and to practice the family planning (Keluarga Berencana/KB).4
Those policies undoubtedly had attracted the mass Muslims organizations’
respond to resist them. Both the Tanjung Priok tragedy on September
14, 1984, and the Talang Sari tragedy on February 7, 1989, then is the
New Order’s atrocity symbol of Islam.5
4 Bahtiar Effendi, Islam dan Negara:Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di
Indonesia. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998, 50. Najib Burhani, “The Reformasi ’98 and the
Arab Spring: A Comparative Study of Popular Uprisings in Indonesia and Tunisia”, Asian
Politics & Policy, Volume 6, Number 2, (2014), 202.
5 Wahyudi Akmaliah, “Ingatan yang Diabaikan: Islam, Kekerasan Masa Lalu, dan Aspirasi
Politik Pasca Orde Baru”, Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 6 Juni 2014, http://
www.politik.lipi.go.id/kolom/kolom-2/politik-nasional/996-ingatan-yang-diabaikan-islam-
kekerasan-masa-lalu-dan-aspirasi-politik-pasca-orde-baru.
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In the third period, it is pretended to be Islamic regime (1990-1998).
Regarding the military’s disappointed partly backing to the Suharto presi-
dency due his family member’s corruption that asked for a greater share
of the pie, he then thought to approach Islam as part of government
system to make his power more stable. It had definitely changed the seri-
ous condition of most Indonesian Muslims from being ‘enemy’ to be
‘friend’ as previously, from a peripheral into a central position in the
government. One of Suharto’s ways firstly for being a pious Muslim was
he went to pilgrimage to Mecca with his families and went back to Jakarta
by adding “Muhammad” as his first name that became Muhammad
Suharto. Besides, his first daughter, Tutut started to wear a veil (kerudung)
while attending the social activity in the public sphere. It was then fol-
lowed by other programs that supported Islamic religion such as both sup-
porting the establishment of the first of Islamic Bank Indonesia, Muamalat,
and endorsing the creation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intel-
lectual (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia/ICMI). Capturing an im-
age of the Suharto presidency that supported Islam, Robert Heffner6 as
cited by Burhani7 has described it correctly as a man who “shattered in one
fell swoop one of the most enduring stereotypes of New Order politics.
Here, after all, was a man long regarded as a staunch defender of Javanese
mysticism and Pancasila pluralism giving his blessing to an elite Muslim
organization openly dedicated to the Islamization of Indonesian society”.
The Talang Sari tragedy
Putting the place of the Talang Sari tragedy from the above narrative, I
can explain that it is the second moment while the Suharto showed as
6 Robert Heffner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000, 128.
7 Najib Burhani, “The Reformasi ’98 and the Arab Spring..., 204.
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anti-Islam. To explain it in detail, I describe it below more locally by ex-
ploring the context of an Islamic group in Talang Sari that connects with
Islamic group from both Solo and Jakarta. As explained, it is not only the
sole of violence that had impacted to Indonesian Muslim committed by
the military; there was previously the Tanjung Priok tragedy happened
in South Jakarta in 1984. However, comparing to the Tanjung Priok, the
Talang Sari was infamous. Instead of happening at the national level and
it was quite close from Jakarta as the capital city of Indonesia, it occurred
in the countryside, especially in the former village of Cihideung, Talang
Sari III, East Lampung (before it was part of South Lampung), South
Sumatera. The location was far from the city of Bandar Lampung as the
center of local government and business traders. Although both were a
different place, mainly between the capital city and town that tended to
influence Indonesian’s perception, they had similarities while the kill-
ings happened due to their resistance to fighting against the Suharto
regime’s policy that often suppressed and marginalized Islam.
There were series of the events that had encouraged the killings, mainly
from December 1988 -January 1989.8 In these years, there were numbers
of people by bringing their families who migrated from Java’s Island (Solo,
Bandung, and Jakarta) to the village of Rajabasa in South Lampung (cur-
rently is East Lampung). The main reason they migrated was as part of
their strategy to hide and to avoid from the operation target during 1985-
196 which acted by Harsudiono Hartas as the General Major of the
Diponegoro Territorial Military Commander. It was regarding their ac-
tivity as the Islamist, joining the Usrah Movement, led by Abdullah
Sungkar in Solo, Central Java. As known, the Suharto regime at the end
of the year 1985 destroyed the Abdullah Sungkar’s Usrah movement
8 KontraS, Peristiwa Talang Sari 1989: Sebuah Kisah Tragis Yang Hendak Dilupakan, Jakarta:
Kontras, 2006.
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due to their resistance to refuse the ideology of Pancasila as the sole basis
through the social organization act of UU No. 3 and 8, in 1985. Mean-
while, in the South Lampung, there were already both Warsidi and his
followers made Islamic gathering become a pious Muslim. The presence
of Fadillah as the member of Usroh Movement by bringing his family
living in the village of Karang Asem, district of Labuhan Maringgai, South
Lampung, joining a house with Darhari as his old friend while they were
in central Java, then made him incidentally met Warsidi. Through these
series of meetings, Warsidi, and his followers as well as Fadillah’s family
steeply wanted to establish Islamic village by planning to build Pondok
Pesantren (Islamic boarding school). They then moved to the village of
Umbul Cihideung especially in the orchard of Talang Sari III, District of
Way Jepara, located in The East (before it was South) Lampung to realize
it after getting 1 ½ hectare of the land freely from Jayus, one of Warsidi’s
followers.9
Though the profession of Warsidi as both religious teacher and ten-
ant farmer, the Islamic gathering he built was quite successful. Both his
charisma and kindness as the symbol of capital for being a pious Muslim
had attracted some local people to bring his children, most of them were
youth (10-19 age), to join his Islamic activities. Indeed, Zamzuri, one of
his followers who were coming from his product of social economic al-
lowed his request to stay Abdullah, one of the Usrah movement mem-
bers in his house as an Islamic teacher in the village of Sidorejo. Through
Abdullah’s teaching in tandem with parents’ dream to educate their boys
and daughters in the line of Islamic religion, many youths of the village
had joint his Islamic gathering. Although his profession as Islamic teacher
9 Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh di Indonesia: Kasus Peristiwa Lampung 1989, Tesis, Pro-
gram Studi Ilmu Sejarah, Bidang Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya, Program Pascasarjana Sastra,
Universitas Indonesia, 2001, 131-133.  Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh Di Indonesia: Peristiwa
Lampung 1989. Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2003, 108-113.
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who taught them in the evening as well as their excellent guide how to
become a pious Muslim by practicing their daily life by Islamic principle,
Abdullah also became Zamzuri’s assistance as a farmer planting rice plant.
Thereby, there were two Islamic gatherings relating each other; the first
was in Sidorejo led by Abdullah especially for Islamic youths and the sec-
ond was in Talang Sari III led by Warsidi as well as some of the Islamists
of Usroh movement coming from the Java Island.
The seed of conflict steeply started while Sukidi, the head of the Talang
Sari village, informed to Zulkifli, the head of the Way Jepara district, on
both Islamic gathering activities and new comers from out of the village
without any permits on 20 January 1989. As Zulkifli’s representation,
Amir Puspa Muga, the head of the village Rajabasa Lama then sent an
invitation letter for Warsidi. The letter content that had been forward-
ing to both the commander of the army administrative unit and the
head of the district of police in Way Jepara was asking him to come and
to meet Zulkifli in his office (Kontras, 2006). As an ordinary people who
never dealt with the government’s apparatus, Warsidi was very nervous
and panic. He did not know what he had to do dealing with the letter.
He then asked his followers, Sofwan went to Jakarta to meet with
Nurhidayat, one of the Usroh movement’s members. At that day,
Nurhidayat with the other members, mainly Sudarsono and Nur iswan,
went to Talang Sari. Through the serious meeting, Warsidi, his follow-
ers, and some other members of Usroh movement discussed the letter
and how they responded it. The point of discussion was definitely propos-
ing the two options; either he had to come or not. Followers said that he
should respond it by coming to the district office, and they would have
accompanied him to explain some reasons why they came to Talang Sari.
The rest suggested him to refuse it because it was only a trick to arrest
him. He finally chose the second option for not going to the office, but
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he just sent the letter that contained the objection and explained some
reasons provocatively why he refused to come. On the contrary, he in-
vited Zulkifli as the district of Way Jepara to come to his place, seeing
what the real condition in Talang Sari was.10
“..…we are really busy with our teaching of Islamic gathering in any
places. Because of this, we cannot come to your office. As Muslim, we
have had the highest commitment to God’s will and the prophet of
Muhammad’s teaching. In a hadith was said that the best of Umara (a
kind of leader in government official) are those who come to Ulama
(Islamic scholars) and the worst of Ulama are those who are coming to
Umara. Therefore, we expect that Bapak (Mr) kindly can come to our
place to know the real condition…..” (Syukur, 2003: 124).
Warsidi sent the letter on January 21, 1989. Surprisingly, both Zulkifli
and his staffs had responded it immediately by coming to Talang Sari at
that day. This quick reply evidently made him and his members surprised.
Because mostly the backgrounds of Islamic gathering members were a
farmer, many of them were going to the field while Zulkifli and his staffs
arrived at the Talang Sari. The rest of them who stayed in Talang Sari
then just welcome them in a simple way. Of course, their arrival was a
good time for Warsidi to explain the presence of Islamic boarding school
and his plan to establish Islamic village. Instead of listening what Warsidi
wanted to say about the real condition, Zulkifli suddenly overlooked him
in the meeting by saying the statement that insulted him.11 The day after
the meeting, especially in the night of January 22, 1989, some local appa-
ratuses came into the village of Talang Sari, while the two of them, using
guns, had entered the small mosque of Al-Muhajirin without taking off
their shoes. They barked at some of the members who were sleeping and
10 Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh di Indonesia..., 135.
11 Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh di Indonesia...., 136. Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh Di
Indonesia:..., 125
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laying down, “this lesson of community was wrong, it’s resisting the gov-
ernment, and this village will be destroyed”. Indeed, they incidentally
pointed a gun directly to the members, mostly were youths. All the mem-
bers of the Mosque did not respond the military’s provocation until they
finally left it.12
The relation between the Warsidi’s Islamic gathering and the local
governments became worst since the meeting. The impact was Zulkifli
Maliki wrote the letter negative report on the Warsidi as the closed of
Islamic gathering that could be a threat to national stability to Soetiman
as the infantry captain in the commander 041121 of the army adminis-
trative unit of Way Jepara on 27 January 1989. The letter then also signi-
fied the changing of the surveillance responsibility from Zulkifli to
Soetiman. This surveillance under Soetiman could be seen by the char-
ter explanation for the three heads of the village (Pakuan Aji, Labuhan
Ratu, and Raja Basa) that were close to the village of Talang Sari to scru-
tinize Warsidi’s Islamic gathering and its activities and they obligated to
make a report if there was something dangerous. In addition, Soetiman
also sent Warsidi the invitation letter for coming to the office of the
Military Headquarters at ward level 041121 at Way Jepara. The condition
undoubtedly made Warsidi and followers more worried. Instead of re-
sponding it, they again refused to come and then tightened for the night
watch and created their guns from bamboo as a form of their self-de-
fense in Talang Sari.13
Because of this situation, Soetiman reported his activities to the Dis-
trict Military Command 0411 of South Lampung which then handled by
12 KontraS, Peristiwa Talang Sari 1989, 2006. Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh di Indonesia:
Kasus Peristiwa Lampung 1989, 2001,....137.  Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh Di Indonesia:
Peristiwa Lampung 1989, 2003,...125.
13 Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh di Indonesia: Kasus Peristiwa Lampung 1989, 2001,....137-
138. Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh Di Indonesia: Peristiwa Lampung 1989, 2003,...125-126.
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E.O Sinaga as the Lieutenant Commander of District Military 0411. They
then had a meeting on 4 February 1989, while it has produced the call
letter of Warsidi for coming to meet them. Again, he refused it. His
rejection then provoked the district military command of Metro to catch
the six youths of the Islamic gathering while they became the night
watcher on February 5, 1989. Instead of coming for calming down a ten-
sion and resolving conflict through such kind of peace agreement, they,
represented by E.O Sinaga with his military troop from the Military Head-
quarters at the ward level of Way Jepara, provoked the members of Islamic
gathering by giving them humiliation words that finally caused the conflict
on February 6, 1989. Due the conflict, it caused the infantry captain of
Soetiman finally died from a machete blow which acted by one of Warsidi’s
followers. The dead of Soetiman was a pretext for the Commander of
043/Garuda Hitam Resort Military Command in Lampung, Hendpriyono
to ‘attack’ them in early morning, 04.00 am, in 7 February 1989, by both
killing and burning them alive. (Syukur, 2001: 138-142; Syukur, 2003: 128-
132; Kontras, 2009: 4-5). Meanwhile, for those members and their fami-
lies who related and even unrelated with the Warsidi’s Islamic gathering as
well as they were lost from the attack had been imprisoned for three months
up to 4 years. Because of this atrocity, as the National Commission on
Human Rights reports through their result investigation in 2008, there
has been human rights violation that impacts the killing of 130 people,
forced expulsion of 77 people, incarceration for 53, tortured by 46 indi-
viduals and ill-treatment or persecution for the amount of 229 people.14
14 Kontras. Kronik Perjalanan Kasus Talang Sari. Jakarta: Kontras, 2009. Elsam, “Siaran
Pers 23 Tahun Tragedi Talangsari: Ketika Negara Menolak Keadilan Korban”, 2012, http:/
/www.elsam.or.id/?id=1769&lang=en&act=view&cat =c/302.
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Dominating discourse of the Talang Sari tragedy in Indonesian public
Through my observation, at least, eleven mass media were covering the
Talang Sari, mainly Kompas, Pelita, Suara Karya, Merdeka, Berita Yudha,
Angkatan Bersenjata, Tempo, Jakarta Post, Suara Pembaharuan, Poskota, and
Antara. Many of them who published it showed that it was not only a
small incident happened locally but also the significant issue nationally.
It could be seen how it was to be either the headline or the first page that
had been published one till seven days after the tragedy. However, to
know how the way of mass media dominated by the state’s information is
by checking out the subject of an informant who became a citation source.
Through the table below, we can consider which one of mass media pre-
dominantly following the authoritarian regime sources.
1. Table. The Talang Sari in Mass Media
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Not including Tempo, many mass media from the table cited the mili-
tary as well as the government’s sources in covering the Talang Sari. There
were four persons, mainly Maj. Gen. R. Sunardi (the Chief of Coordina-
tion of Support for the Development of National Stability/Bakorstanasda
for South Sumatera), Gen. Try Sutrisno (the Commander of Indonesian
Armed Forces), and Sudomo (the Indonesian Ministry Coordinator of
Politic and Defense). Among those persons’ words, R Sunardi was the
most one who talked it in detail and comprehensively, in which the
amount of the victims was only 30 people. However, regarding the words’
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content, their saying in the Indonesian public was in the same line. There
was explaining that the subject of violator was Komando Jihad Fisabilillah,
and the aim of the movement was to destruct Indonesian nationality and
its stability as a form of the subversive group who was anti-Pancasila as the
sole of Indonesian state foundation.
The hordes that use religion as the mask was trying systematically to
agitate people to undermine both nation and state through the actual
speeches by saying, for instances, the government was unbeliever. They
also prohibited going to Indonesian public school and becoming Indone-
sian government official as well as asking to fight against Indonesian
Armed Forces and denying for paying the tax…The Hordes that called
themselves as a command of Jihad Fisabilillah was subversive movement.
Before growing largely and more dangerous, while the case was still be-
ginning the level, they had to finish it immediately (Maj. General R.
Sunardi, the Chief of Coordination of Support for the Development of
National Stability, Pelita, 10 February 1989).15
However, compared to those mass media, Poskota was a little bit dif-
ferent by giving space for both Jailani Naro and Mardinsyah as the repre-
sentative of the National Leadership Council of the United Develop-
ment Party that well known as Islamic party in Indonesia. Instead of giv-
15 See, “Due to the event in Lampung at the first of this week, the Commander of
Indonesian Armed Forces asserted that he just justified any acts firmly and wisely by security
apparatuses regarding on every movement that could be disturbing (Indonesian) national
stability and gnawing national development where they obviously as anti-Pancasila ideology
and the 1945 constitution. ‘I appeal for Indonesian to keep calm and to stay aware as well
as to uphold national unity’ (Gen. Try Sutrisno, the Commander of Indonesian Armed
Forces, Suara Karya, 10 February 1989). “Beside of the latent danger of G30S/PKI such as
a right extremist, left extremist, Sudomo reminded that the group of society who provoked
liberal term and used the name of religion as a tool to achieve their goal was a threat for
national stability that must be aware constantly..., His awareness of the movement that
acted by the groups of society was either a thing-fetched or castle in the air” (Sudomo, the
Indonesian Ministry Coordinator of Politic and Defense, Poskota, 11 February 1989).
19
Indonesian Muslim killings: revisiting the forgotten Talang Sari tragedy (1989)... (Wahyudi Akmaliah)
ing a different view about it, they supported the government opinion by
reading an open statement that the tragedy was both disturbing national
stability and destructing Pancasila. Because of this, every threat move-
ment then must be eradicated. They also appealed all Indonesian, espe-
cially the party member to be aware of every issue that could be a trigger
to destruct for Indonesian United and its national stability (Poskota, 11
February 1989). Despite what they said seemingly as same as the
government’s words that represented by three persons above, this state-
ment could be seen as an indicator of an Islamic group that predomi-
nantly did not support it. Whereas, in 1978, the United Development
Party as the one Islamic party hardly criticized the New Order’s policy on
implementing the doctrine of Pancasila as the sole of all Indonesian ide-
ology through a training of P4 (upgrading course on the directives for the
realization and implementation of Pancasila/Pedoman, Penghayatan, dan
Pengamalan Pancasila) in the Associate Council Meeting of People’s Con-
sultative Assembly (Sidang Umum MPR). The form of these members of
the United Development Party’s resistance could be seen by their act of
walk out in the midst of meeting.16
Unlike those mass media, Tempo, based on both library research and
investigation report, tried to take a different view by covering it compre-
hensively. The aim of doing this was to provide “a reportage event hon-
estly to be trusted by doing both check and balance as long as they can, so
Indonesian would not be confused regarding on the hearsay” that was
published in national newspaper. To take both sides in covering, Tempo
then pointed their three journalists, mainly Agung Firmansyah, Gunung
Sardjono, and Ahmadie Thaha to investigate it. As a result, they did not
only get the tragedy chronologically but also made a map of the Talang
16 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu
Solahudin, 2011, 165.
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Sari III village that consist of houses where many Warsidi’s members were
living. In addition, by taking interview with local people around and within
the village (such as Sukidi, Imam Saputra, and Amir Puspa Mega), they
knew at deeper the context of the Talang Sari village environment be-
tween residents and newcomers as well as the background of Warsidi’s
members that were coming from “Islamic militant people” whom in-
tended to establish Islamic state in Indonesia (Tempo, 18 February 1989).
However, citing the government apparatuses as the essential informa-
tion, this investigation report eventually tended to blame on Warsidi and
his members of Islamic gathering activities. Tempo did not mention the
members that were coming from many backgrounds. One of them were
both ordinary and poor people who did not know what was Islamic ideol-
ogy as well as they were an apolitical experience of being Islamists. The
things that encouraged them to join the Islamic gathering were they
wanted to learn Islamic religion and its values deeply in the midst of their
activities as mostly farmers. Given this explanation, I realized, as they
considered in introduction of editor letter on the first page of this maga-
zine, doing an investigation report in the midst of authoritarian regime
power was not easy while the military group, represented by Gen. R.
Sunardi, Gen. Try Sutrisno, and Hendropriyono as the Commander of
043/Garuda Hitam Resort Military Command in Lampung tried to re-
strict information around it and to block its location from within the
Talang Sari village residents and out of the local people as well as Indone-
sian generally. The main reason they did this way was in order to control
a public discourse largely that they were not the enemy as mostly Indone-
sian Muslim perceived. The tragedy of Tanjung Priok that caused around
hundreds of Muslim killed on September 12, 1984, was the real example
how faces of the New Order regime as being anti-Islam.
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From 9-14 February 1989, the mass media called the tragedy on the
five terms; 1) the event of Lampung, 2) the event of Talang Sari, 3) the
event of Way Jepara, 4) the Command of the Mujahidin Fisabilillah (Mus-
lims who struggle in path of Allah) members and 5) Warsidi’s Security
Disturbance Movement (GPK Warsidi). Despite all mass media had their
term to call, but many of them used Mujahidin Fisabilillah as the first
calling which was introduced by Gen. R. Sunardi. Meanwhile both Try
Sutrisno, and Hendropriyono only strengthened their words. It seemed
that the name of Mujahidin was taken by considering the international
context of the Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979-1989) where the Afghani-
stan opposition groups well known as the Mujahidin, whom both pro-
vided assistance and supported aid by the US, fought against the govern-
ment of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
Nevertheless, instead of negative name in making an image of Warsidi
and his members as an opponent group against the government, it was
then worried to pay Indonesian Muslim attention to become more sym-
pathy with his movement. Through the government apparatuses that
represented by Brigadier Gen, Nurhadi, the Indonesian National Armed
Force’s the Head of Information Center; they replaced the name of
Mujahidin to become GPK Warsidi. Instead of deserving to labeling as
Mujahidin Fisabilillah, for him, it was correctly called as GPK Warsidi/
Anwar (the Security Disturbance Movement led by Anwar Warsidi), be-
cause their movement had caused of disadvantage for all Indonesian
Muslim (Pelita, 16 February 1989). Though the name were coming from
Warsidi and his members as the military thought, this replacing name
was also asserted by Try Sutrisno to strengthen a character of Warsidi’s
movement. For him, they were inappropriate with both the proper name
of Mujahidin Fisablillah itself and as part of the Islamic movement.
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According to the Commander of Indonesian Armed Forces (Try
Sutrisno), the group name of Mujahidin Fisabilillah was found Warsidi
himself as the Security Disturbance Movement. In fact, the name of
Mujahidin Fisabilillah was a good reputation. The group of Warsidi
used it intentionally to achieve both sympathy and support for Indo-
nesian people (Suara Pembaharuan, 22 February 1989).
Of course, replacing the name was not only a way to delegitimize it as
a movement that could be representing Islam in Indonesia as a form of
protest but also showing the government’s effort to influence Indone-
sian public discourse, primarily Muslim mass organizations. Doing both
consolidation and coordination by coming to some mass Muslim organi-
zations’ meetings such as both Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama as
well as inviting many Islamic religious leaders as well as Islamic teacher in
Lampung after the tragedy by the military could be seen as one of those
indicators. After doing this, the government began practicing stigma for
the tragedy and Warsidi’s members in proposing negative issues, such as
a right extremist, communist (PKI), and GPK that not recognize Indone-
sian state and asking their members to not paying taxes and disobedient
for Pancasila as the sole of Indonesian ideology. Indeed, they also per-
ceived as a movement who wanted either to do or not to do. For in-
stance, they perceived 1) to do free sex relying on their doctrine, ‘my joy
is also yours’ (nikmatku adalah nikmatmu), 2) to not wearing trousers for
man and bra for a woman, 3) and to practice a deviance stream (aliran
sesat) of lelampah.17
Those conditions were successful in shaping mostly Indonesian
Muslim’s view on the tragedy, where the three biggest mass Muslim orga-
17 Some of indicators of the Lelampah stream were their members compulsory; 1) to
pray five times at the land without using a carpet, 2) to prohibit finding out riches, 3) and
to not allowed for praying together an out of their members, although they were as the same
Muslims. Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh Di Indonesia: Peristiwa Lampung 1989. 2003,...1.
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nizations as the representative of Indonesia Muslims, such as
Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama, and Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI)
were eventually not only refusing it as a part of Islam but also suspecting it
as the other of Islam that the so called as the splinter group of Muslim
(aliran sesat) who were out from Islam. Besides those factors, there are two
reasons why they were relatively objection with it. Firstly, it was more politi-
cal orientation where both previously agreed with Pancasila as the sole of
all Indonesian ideology. Secondly, compared to both who had Islamic school
of thought relying on the four imam as the primary sources in the com-
mon of Islamic Law (Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi’i, and Hambali) in their practical
religious orientation, the Talang Sari was only based on the imam Ja’fari as
their school of thought in Islamic jurisprudence (Syukur, 2003: 147). None-
theless, there is the fact that was some of the members originally from
Muhammadiyah, such as Zamzuri, Azwar Kaili, Amir, and Suparmo.18
Islah and cultural impunity
The emergence of islah
In regard of change period (1998-2000), although it was one of the
cases could be revealed, there was a movement coming from AM
18 Meanwhile, this producing stigma could be seen through the victims and their families’
experiences during the Suharto presidency while they perceived as PKI (Indonesian Com-
munist Party), a group of rebellion, a splinter group of Muslim and the other stereotypes in
discriminating them.  The voice of Ibu (Mdm) Widaningsih is as one of the victims’ voices
that describes those conditions. “As a witness, I was not only seeing and listening but also
facing the terrible of Talang Sari tragedy. There were more than two thousand victims killed
and many of them who were living lost their valuable things had been marginalized by
people around them. They also stigmatized as an insurgent, communist (PKI), and as part of
deviate group. Because of this, I realize that the tragedy happened and, on the other hand,
Indonesia is a state of the law. I hope it could be revealed through a rule of law with the
fairest way for perpetrators, whoever they are and victims and its families who have been still
living on the other hand” (Widaningsih. 23 June 2007/Berita Acara Pemeriksaan/Nomor:
47/TPPT/VI/2007/Komnas Ham)
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Hendpriyono as a ‘perpetrator’ to not uncover it by offering at (reconcili-
ation in Islamic term) on around of the one month after Suharto stepped
down. There is one reason why he offered it vastly than most academi-
cian and human rights activists thought. When Habibie, the vice of Indo-
nesian, became Suharto’s successor as a president, this condition gave a
chance for Hendropriyono to replace Wiranto as Commander in Chief
of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). For human rights activists,
Wiranto himself was a mastermind behind some of the blood tragedies,
such as the disappeared activists (1997), the riot of May (1998), the event
of Semanggi (1998), the killing of dukun santet/Shaman (1997), and the
conflict among Muslim and Christian in Ambon (1999). However, be-
cause of some reasons, Habibie canceled to hire him and then gave a
position to to as the Ministry of Transmigration and Forest Squatter
Resettlement. Despite he got a good position, it did not mean he was
clear from Suharto legacies of violence in the midst of transition era as
the juncture from an authoritarian regime to democracy system. He was
still a problem with human rights past violation, mainly the Talang Sari.
Doing the act of islah as one of his initiatives to erase his responsibility
eventually was a rational option.19
Although Kontras’s report saying that peace agreement in the name
of Islah had been done for four times (2009), after collecting documenta-
tion from mass media, I just can say only twice of the Islah agreement
between perpetrator and victims did. First is peace agreement in 1998
represented by some of the victims (such as Nurhidayat, Sudarsono, Fauzi,
Maulana, and Ahmad Yani Wahid) and AM Hendropriyono as a person
who responsible for the Talang Sari tragedy. Through this agreement,
the victims got some compensation. Second is a peace agreement in 1999
as a form of negotiation between Hendpropriyono and the victims who
19 Wahyudi Akmaliah, Menggadaikan Islah...,116-117.
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become political prisoners during the Suharto presidency. The result of
it was there were thirteen from fourteen of the victims who previously
become political prisoners had been released from the prison based on
the presidential decree remission, no. 101/G/1998. Because of this, the
case of Talang Sari tragedy had been closed, and those of the victims, as
well as Hendropriyono, then declared the Islah National Movement
(Gerakan Islah Nasional /GIN) as a nation moral movement.20 The idea
of Islah movement then introduced by those to other victims and their
families following the two kinds of compensation they would get, the
mainly amount of money as a capital for their small business and a job
they would get a contract labor in the farm of shrimps and plantation of
oil palm as promised by Hendropriyono. Hendro also built a mosque
within the village of Talang Sari. However, many victims in the midst of
Islah process felt they were betrayed on the agreement. Those of the 28
victims then gave a public statement in a press conference that they were
out of islah agreement on September 6, 2001. Accompanied by KontraS,
they also insisted the Indonesian government reveal it. Meanwhile, the
rest of them still want to forget their past violation by hindering the
other victims whom wanted to demand justice in coming to the govern-
ment and its institutions and, on the other hand, they often socialize
that the case has been closed by promoting GIN.
In regard to the betrayal agreement, it seemingly was not coming from
Hendropiyono himself but from the elite of victims that always take a
position as a medium between Hendro and all of the Talang Sari victims.
As the person who were represented and believed by all of the victims,
they used their position to take advantage, mostly to get money.21 In
20 Irfan S Awwas, Trauma Lampung Berdarah: Di balik Manuver Hendropriyono. Yogyakarta:
Wihdah Press, 2000.  Kompas, 18 Januari 1999.  Kontras, 2006. Wahyudi, 2009).
21 Sugeng Yulianto as one of the victims’ voices below can explain it very well, “Not too
long after release, Sudarno invited me by phone to celebrate syukuran (an expression of
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regard of the elite of the victims as negotiator to get advantage, it also
happens in the case of Tanjung Priok. In the name of Tim Tujuh (a
group of seven) as thought the victims’ representation, they exploited
the victims’ identities to reconcile with perpetrators in the islah way while
the Tanjung Priok court Ad Hoc definitely will be holding on one month
later. Ironically, unlike the case of Talang Sari, this islah initiative was
not coming from perpetrators but from the member of the victims as
the so-called of Tim Tujuh. Instead of seeing a victim as apolitical person
who are poor idea and a weak condition so therefore people should help
them to get justice, in this context, the victim also has an autonomy body
to negotiate their identity with perpetrators in order to achieve a goal
what they want. On other hand, they understand very well that perpe-
trators need their false narrative to help them from their act of violence
in the past. Here, there were many things they got by doing this way in
the case of Tanjung Priok. They were not only got much money from
gratitude to God) together with the former prisoners of Nusakambangan Penitentiary at
Jakarta Jakarta. Surprisingly, he brought me and other friends to the Mosque of Al Muhajirin
at Department of Transmigration and Forest Squatter Resettlement in order to meet
Hendropriyono as the Minister Transmigration and Forest Squatter Resettlement. The day
was Friday when we did Jumat pray together. After praying, I met him. When he hugged and
kissed me on the left and the right cheek, he said that “It is true that you are sentenced less
than ten years. Now we forgive each other and I will pay more an attention on the former
prisoners’ prosperity”. It seemed that his promise only for certain people who closed to him.
There was ever that Sutan Sharir from Hendpriyono’s a lawyer, sent me money through my
child. Another day, Maulana Latif from Cilengsi, West Java, come to me to look around a
condition of my house. Maulana informed me about the investor. His name is Firman who
works as a butcher of cattle at Pasar Klender. He is really interested in growing vastly of
cattle. Maulana then gave me money of the twelve thousand million rupiah (1200 USD)
where those money he got from Firman. I then used it for buying six of cow. I just realized
that the money definitely was from Hendpriyono. I got this information while
Hendropriyono invited me together with Maulana to his house in Cibubur, West Java.
Hendro surprised when he knew that only the six cows I raised because he already gave fifty
million rupiah (5000 USD) to Maulana. Maulana just said to us that all of the rest money
had been given to all of the victims. Sugeng Yulianto. 21 Juni 2007/Berita Acara Pemeriksaan/
Nomor: 26/TPPT/VI/2007/Komnas HAM
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perpetrators but also got valuable things to make their life more survival
such as motorcycle and network to get job access.22
Islah as a mode of reconciliation
The questions that remain on Islah as Islamic term for reconciliation
and peace agreement in Islamic perspective in the case of Talang Sari are
whether is it used to strengthen an argument of reconciliation following
the sources of Islam (Al-Quran and Sunnah)? or only as a pretext to for-
get past violation without revealing the truth in court? As long as I trace,
there is no document and note regarding the Islah agreement. Indeed,
there is no explanation why they use the name of Islah. The information
I can trace on the term of Islah in the case of Talang Sari is only from the
book of Geger Talang Sari: Serpihan Gerakan Darul Islam, written by
Widjiono Wasis. Instead of explaining it in the proper way, the author
accuses all of the victims as those people who want to establish Islamic
country by joining the group of Darul Islam. The book then is more kind
of propaganda to blame all of the victims rather than to give an explana-
tion proportionally why the tragedy happened and what the main reason
Islah has emerged in post-Suharto regime vastly is.
In this book, Wasis talks Islah within the two chapters, mainly Islah
sebagai Alternatif Penyelesaian (Islah as an alternative Solution, 218-225)
and Respon Seputar Islah (a respond around islah, 226-239). In the chap-
ter, he describes it in two explanations. First is about the term Islah itself.
For him, the word of Islah originally comes from the source of Al-Quran.
Islah means either peace or improvement. Ordering for Islah, it covers
all of the improvement that related and consists of theological (tashlihul-
aqidah), worship (tashlihul ibadah), moral (tashlihul akhlak), economic
(tashlihul iqtishodiyah), and political system (tashlihul siyasah). All of those
22 Wahyudi Akmaliah, Menggadaikan Islah ...,143-147.
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improvements, Wasis asserts, is focused more on increasing the commit-
ment to improve that already right. However, ordering Islah, in particu-
lar, is more on improving things that are already damaged, especially on
improving social relation (tashilul mua’malah) by ending conflict, tension,
blasphemy as well as enmity. Second is practiced islah in the context of
Muhammad prophet era as a case study. For example, under the leader-
ship of Khalid bin Walid, there were troops in feeling angry who killed
the tribe of Banu Jadhimah, whereas the battle among them was already
over. Due this critical situation, Muhammad then decided to point Ali
Bin Abi Thalib to investigate it by saying, “go directly to those people, do
examining in detail, and act stopping to end the bad habit they have.”
He also asked Ali to bring money to exchange for the spilled blood and
the loss of property in the battle.
At the first explanation, instead of explaining profoundly, Wasis just
describes it partly and examines it in literally. For him, the significant of
Islah is to improve social relation among people that are previously dam-
aged due to conflict and tension. Does he not examine what is the mean-
ing of Islah in the context of Islamic jurisprudence while killing is hap-
pening? How the mechanism of forgiveness in the midst of public court
to achieve justice? What is both reparation and compensation that the
victims will get? In the second explanation, he also does not explore it
deeply regarding the right of the victims they have to get it and what a
lesson learned for Indonesian public so the tragedy will be not happen-
ing again in the future. By proposing the picture of Muhammad’s prophet
era, he seemingly assumes that the killing in the Talang Sari is just both
conflict and tension as a simple business without causing victims and dead
people. In fact, regarding killing, there is a discussion of the qisos (killing)
concept that consist of four level deal with the behind reason of people
why they kill and its consequences in Islamic jurisprudence. Therefore,
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the term of Islah and how it is practiced in the case of Talang Sari are a
pretext to forget the past violation rather than proposing peace agree-
ment in Islamic perspective as a proper way to end the conflict and to cut
off vengeance.
To strengthen Islah as a mode of reconciliation that could be a pretext
as explained above, I argue that there are three impacts that could be
seen clearly. In the first point, in the name of Islah, the victims’ group
who were joining at GIN tried to block every effort for both the Na-
tional Commission on Human Rights in tandem with KontraS in order
to reveal the truth of the tragedy by establishing the Commission of In-
quiry on Human Rights Violation (KPP HAM). Also, they often said in
the public that the case is already closed, and they did not want to recall
their bitter past by revealing it due to both some of them and perpetra-
tors had made an agreement in the mode of Islah. In the second point,
they terrorized the other victims. The victims group who were pros of
Islah often terrorizes the other whom as anti of Islah in two ways; 1) they
were not only blocking the other victims who wanted to cross Island at
the harbor of Bakeuni-Merak but also giving a threat in order to kill
them if they really wanted to go to Jakarta, 2) by using local apparatuses,
they also threaten for those victims will be losing their family member if
they still insisted on seeking justice. In the third point is an act of forget-
ting. A local government in the village of Talang Sari often visited the
victims by face to face in their houses. Instead of talking about the case
condition, they asked them to forget the past violation by giving them
money around Rp.5000 (50 Cent USD)-10.000 (1 USD) as a form of
hush money to keep their memory silently. Also, there were Hendro’s
people as his representation person who were holding Islamic gathering
regularly by inviting the victims and individuals around Talang Sari. This
Islamic gathering is not on only used to teach Islamic values but also as
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space to deliver a doctrine by a preacher so the victims would not de-
mand their justice in the court.23
It is evident that Islah has been one of many factors among the barri-
ers to obtain justice. Instead of structural level in the government’s insti-
tutional justices as well as the judicial proceedings to process human rights
court, I argue islah is one of the negative contributions that has strength-
ened cultural impunity, so human rights past violation are quite difficult
to reveal in the post-authoritarian regime, especially in the case of Talang
Sari. Through cultural negotiation in the name of islah as if they use
Islamic term for making peace and reconciliation, both the victims and
perpetrators try to false their memory on what was happening in the
past. Although there are some of the victims, insist on pursuing their
struggle to get justice, this fragmented memory (between remembering
and forgetting) among them caused a lot of difficulties to prove it legally
up to now. On another hand, one of the cases that are using islah as the
pretext to forget the past that then made the victims group had divided
into the two memories is the Tanjung Priok case. Because of this islah
agreement, the Human Rights Ad Hoc of Tanjung Court then has been
released perpetrators from their responsibility in 2007 (Akmaliah, 2009).
I believe if there is no solution deal with the problem of islah in Talang
Sari, it will be the same condition as the Tanjung Priok though the case
still unsolved currently.
Concluding remarks
Unlike the Tanjung Priok, the Talang Sari is relatively obscure for many
social scientists to conduct research, due to the location that is away from
Jakarta to the capital city. In addition, the influence of the New Order
23 KontraS, Peristiwa Talang Sari 1989: Sebuah Kisah Tragis Yang Hendak Dilupakan,
Jakarta: Kontras, 2006, 9-10.
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regime in dominating public discourse through a centralized mass media
nationally to cite the information source from the government and the
background of the biggest mass Muslim organizations (NU and
Muhammadiyah) that already agreed to implement Pancasila as the sole
of their ideology in 1980s had strengthened Warsidi and his followers as
the deviant group of Islam, well known as GPK.
In fact, there are three factors why it happened. First, it is the na-
tional level where the case is like the second moments while Suharto
perceived Islam as a threat by controlling and forcing all political parties.
In addition, it is all mass organizations including Islamic organizations to
adopt the state of ideology as the sole of their ideological basis as well as
prohibiting every symbol that showing Islam in the public sphere. Se-
cond, there were people who migrated from Java to the village of Rajabasa
in South Lampung as part of their strategy to avoid from the operation
target during 1985-1986 which acted by Harsudiono Hartas, the General
Major of the Diponegoro Territorial Military Commander, regarding
their activity as the Islamist whom joint the Usrah Movement, led by
Abdullah Sungkar in Solo, Central Java. Those people then met Warsidi
and his followers to make Islamic village. Due to their influence, Warsidi’s
Islamic gathering was hardest and radical dealt with the local govern-
ment and its policy. Third is the series of unresolved local conflict be-
tween Warsidi’s Islamic gatherings (including the members of Usroh
movement) versus local apparatuses particularly the military group from
the Indonesian Armed Force. Undeniably, Warsidi’s attitude in establish-
ing a relationship with the local devices was worst, especially Warsidi and
his members’ stubborn who did not want to come to the call letter that
had been invited to three times. Although, the act of killing in attacking
them in the early morning on February 7, 1989, is abuses of their power as
the government apparatuses that committed human rights violations.
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In the post of Suharto regime, there is hope for the victims of violations
to break their silences including the victims of Talang Sari tragedy. This
condition, cited the report of both ICTJ and KontraS (2011), is as the mo-
mentous change (1998-2000) under both the Habibie and Abdurahman
Wahid Presidency, who have had clear of political commitment to transi-
tional justice. The momentum then was stolen by Hendropriyono to make
a clear of his name while he took a position as the Minister of Transmigra-
tion and Forest Squatter Resettlement by offering islah to the most of the
victims and their families in 1999 and 2000. Sadly, the Islah agreement
becomes a fundamental factor as the barrier to reveal it due to the victims’
option; mostly they are pros of Islah, who want to forget the past of their
bitter memories by pawning their identities of the victim-ness to get the
economic benefit. Though there are many problems as said before why
those cases of human rights violations difficult to bring to court, the islah
agreement becomes a negative contribution why cultural impunity steeply
embedded to bring justice for the victims, mostly in the case of Talang Sari
and Tanjung Priok.
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